Civil Action No. 84-3040 Plaintiff\u27s Reply Brief by United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Hollins University 
Hollins Digital Commons 
Ann B. Hopkins Papers Manuscript Collections 
5-24-1985 
Civil Action No. 84-3040 Plaintiff's Reply Brief 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A N B. HOPKINS
Plaintiff




Ann Hopkins has shown that sex discrimination played a signifi¬
cant role in Price Waterhouse's refusal to ma e her a partner. This
is true both of the firm's decision to place her candidacy on hold
and of the subsequent failure to accord her the sa e reconsideration
given to men put on hold. Given this showing that discrimination
infected the partnership decision, defendant must prove that plain¬
tiff would not have been admitted even absent discrimination.
Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 403 F.Supp. 1240
(D.D.C. 1975), reversed on other grounds, 551 F.2d 436 (D.C.Cir.
1975); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See Bell v.
Birmin ham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983):
Once an [illegal] motive is proved to have
been a significant or substantial factor in
an employment decision, defendant can rebut
only by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same decision would have
been reached even absent the presence of that
factor.
(Emphasis in original.)
Price Waterhouse has not carried its burden in this case.
Instead, the firm has simply tried to ignore some of the  ost
telling evidence of discrimination.
This evidence, discussed more fully in plaintiff1s main
brief and summarized hereafter, must be considered within the
context of the leverage which the Price  aterhouse partnership
process gives to a small fraction of partners to veto a
candidate. At the national level this veto can be exercised by
partners who have had little or no contact with the candidate,
and it can override the strong support of those who know the
candidate well. The 1982 long-form comments on plaintiff's
candidacy were  —1—1 in her favor, and the single no was
discounted because it came from the curmudgeonly Mr. Statland.
The short—form comments of partners whose contact with Hop ins
was remote in time or limited in extent, or both, were what
blocked her candidacy (Green, Haller, Hartz, Wheaton, Docter,
Everett, Bruges, Carroll, Johnson, Hoffman; see Df. Ex. 27, Tr.
684-699). This handful of "no," "hold," or "insufficient" short
form comments persuaded Joseph Connor that there was "no way in
which a yes decision could possibly be reached and yet I was
mindful that she was a good capable professional" (Connor dep. at
29) .
While an explicit sexist such as Mr. Jerbasi is a rarity in
the civilized milieu of Price Waterhouse partners, a subtler form
of sexism characterizes a large number of the negative 1982
comments on plaintiff. The pithy Policy Board summary of these
comments was that Ann Hopkins lacked social grace, a
description the Board did not use for even the crudest and most
offensive male candidates.
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The strong comments of these partners fit the pattern of
intensely negative reactions based on limited occasional contact
that Dr. Susan Fiske identified as a hallmark of stereotyping.
It is not, of course, inconsistent with that pattern that some of
these men might support a woman candidate from their own office,
or that they might on occasion also criticize male candidates
with whom they in fact had greater professional contact. It is
the felt freedom and willingness to take long range "pot shots"
at plaintiff that is striking.
This "blackball" phenomenon is important in two respects in
analyzing the evidence in this case. On the one hand, it gives
great weight to limited-contact vocal opponents such as Dr. Fiske
described. On the other, however, the Policy Board has the
authority to accept a candidate despite objections. For Ann
Hopkins, the process ended with the initial objections, which
were sex-based. Despite her prodigious contributions to the
firm's growth, which far exceeded those of Tom Green, Ernest
Puschaver or others, management refused to impose its will on the
minority in her case. The evidence shows that her sex was the
dividing line, and it was also the key to the objections that
defeated her candidacy.
1. The Emphasis on Femininity
Defendant tries to play down the counseling plaintiff re¬
ceived concerning what the firm calls "her grooming and personal
appearance." This refers, of course, to the advice Thomas Beyer
gave Hopkins to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely." Roger Marcellin, a Policy Board and
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Admissions Committee member, said that Beyer "knew exactly where
the problems were," and Beyer's counseling shows that plaintiff s
principal problem in the partnership process was a perception by
some of the partners that she lacked femininity. This is corrob¬
orated by Lewis Krulwich's exchange with Marcellin concerning
plaintif  s use of profanity, to which some partners had ob¬
jected. Krulwich said that " [p]eople are just focusing on that
because its a lady using foul language," and added: "Many male
partners are worse than  nn (language and tough personality)."
Price Waterhouse tries to use Joseph Connor's testimony to
suggest that men are given counseling similar to that given to
Hopkins by Mr. Beyer. But actually Mr. Connor said that counsel¬
ing on appearance occurs "extremely occasionally" (Connor dep. at
22.) In fact, the only instance he could recall was a man with a
serious weight problem, and there the concern was the man's
health (Id.). That is not the situation here. Ann Hopkins was
told that she needed to walk, talk and dress "more femininely" in
order to become a partner. This type of advice was unique to
her, and it is direct evidence of sex discrimination in the part¬
nership process.
2. Balancing and the Double Standard
There is hard evidence of discrimination in addition to
Price Waterhouse' s evident concern with plaintiffs
"femininity." It is clear that in most respects Ann Hopkins  as
a superior performer   practice development, technical com¬
petence, management ability, client relations. The only osten¬
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sible concern raised about her lay in the area of "interpersonal
skills." For men in this position   i.e., those with superior
professional attributes but about whom personality issues had
been raised   Price Waterhouse balanced the pro's and con's.
And if the only negative had to do with interpersonal skills, the
male candidates invariably were admitted. Ann Hopkins is the
only partnership candidate with acknowledged superiority in pro¬
fessional attributes who was rejected solely for asserted defi¬
ciencies in interpersonal skills.
Plaintiff has pointed to four men who were admitted despite
serious concerns about their personalities: Tom Green, Ernest
Puschaver, David Todd and Michael Steinberg. In addition, Donald
Ziegler, who chairs the Admissions Committee, responded "Oh, yes"
when asked whether other men had been admitted despite doubts
about their interpersonal skills.
Defendant has focused on Green and Puschaver and has charac¬
terized the concerns about their personal styles as "clearly
limited." This is inaccurate; the concerns were quite serious  
but these men were nevertheless admitted. According to Joseph
Connor, "I think the decision would have gone against To 
[Green]" because of his manners and style, but he was saved by
his EDP skills. Puschaver was admitted over the Admissions Com¬
mittee's hold recommendation that noted that he had been describ¬
ed as "lacking maturity," as having a "wise-guy attitude, and as
being "headstrong," "abrasive and overbearing," and cocky. It
.i/ Defendant's argument th t the projects plaintiff  anaged w re fraught
wi h personality problems misstates her testimony and the record in this case.
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is surely misleading to describe the Admissions Committee's con¬
cerns about Puschaver as "limited," yet he too was admitted.
Defendant has not addressed Todd or Steinberg, but the
Policy Board's comments about them are revealing. Despite con¬
cerns about Todd's "stubbornness and inflexibility," a Board
member observed that "[h]e does excellent work in bringing in
wor ," and he was admitted. Similarly, Steinberg received
several negative comments because of a "weak first im ression,"
but a Board member said that "in areas in which he is working
they want results and are not concerned about first impressions"
(emphasis supplied). Steinberg too became a partner.
Our point is not that partners at Price Waterhouse ne er
co ment on the personalities of partnership candidates. On the
contrary, this happens routinely.  / But the Policy Board just
as routinely weighs negative comments about interpersonal skills
against the candidates' professional attributes and achieve¬
ments. If there are also questions about such things as practice
development or technical competence, then a candidate may not be
admitted. But if a candidate is generally superior   and if the
only concern has to do with interpersonal skills   then the
balance is struck in favor of admission, usually i  ediately,
occasionally after a hold. The only exception was Ann Hopkins.
Price  aterhouse has tried to suggest that men like Green
and Puschaver were admitted because they possessed talents
Of course, Df. Ex. 68 and 74,  hich compile such remarks, do not place
them in context. For this reason, the Court admitted these exhibits for the
"limited purpose" of showing that such comments  ere the "regular fod er ot
the admissions process (Tr. 719-721).
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vitally needed by the firm. 3/ But so did plaintiff. Her forte
was large scale computer systems design and implementation, an
area in which the firm keenly needs well qualified partners, as
Donald Ziegler ac nowledged:
Q. Do you recall testifying on deposition that the
firm had then and continues to ha e a very
pressing need for partners who have skills in
the systems requirements area?
A. We have a continuing need for qualified people
in all areas.
Q. But particularly in systems?
A. Yes, including EDP and large scale systems and
implementation, yes.
Q. And that was [plaintiff's] area, large scale
systems and implementation?
A. She was an MCS specialist specializing in that
area, yes.
(Tr. 277.)
Ann Hopkins was not working in some backwater. She was at
the cutting edge of Price  aterhouse's practice, and her per¬
formance there was outstanding. A man in her position would have
been admitted to partnership, most likely immediately and cer¬
tainly after being held. Hence the type of "weighing" or
"balancing" that was done for men was not done for plaintiff. It
is for this reason that the testimony of high level State Depart¬
ment officials is quite relevant to this case, despite
defendant's contrary argument. This is part of the evidence that
shows plaintiff's generally superb qualifications, which the firm
There is no evidence that this was true for Puschaver. His banking
skills were not the type that Mr. Connor described as being in short supply
(Connor dep. at 34).
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did not weigh. Similarly, Price Waterhouse tries to argue that
Ann Hopkins was controversial and to suggest that controversial
candidates could not be admitted. But Green was controversial,
as was Puschaver. So was Roger Hindman, who was admitted in 1984
despite a hold recommendation from Policy Board member W.  .
Kingsbery:
[Hin man] is so well  nown and is a feisty,
controversial sort of person that his early a mission
could create some problems, I  ould think, among other
tax managers. He has a strong personality, and some
individuals do not like him that well.
(PI. Ex. 74 at 1984 Kingsbery comments; emphasis supplied.)
Men who were good got in, despite concerns about their
interpersonal skills or their "controversial" nature. But not
Ann Hopkins.
3. Plaintiff's Post-Hold Treatment
There is only one partnership selection process at Price
Waterhouse. It is centrally established an  operated. Defendant
cannot escape liability by trying to balkanize the process and by
arguing that the failure to re-propose plaintiff must be analyzed
solely within the confines of the Office of Government Services
(OGS). At the firm there is a well established practice of re¬
proposing a candidate after he is placed on hold and   in most
cases   actually admitting him. The failure even to re-propose
plaintiff cannot fairly be examined without considering the prac¬
tice and expectation that candidates put on hold will be fully
reconsidered the next year. Nor can the failure to re-propose be
examined apart from the related failure of Chairman Joseph Connor
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and Vice Chairman Paul Goodstat to assist plaintiff as the firm
had helped male candidates who were on hold. Men put on hold
were assisted, re-proposed and admitted; in short, hold status
was a meaningful option for men. It was not for plaintiff.
Perhaps most egregious, defendant now attempts to argue that
one of the two partners who blocked plaintiff's re-proposal 
Benton Warder legitimately questioned her management ability.
But Price Waterhouse conceded at trial that plaintiff s technical
and management skills are not at issue in this case, and the firm
is foreclosed from making this argument.
Mr. Warder conducted a review of the Department of State's
Real Estate Management System (REMS) project in the spring of
1983, after Hopkins was  laced on hold. Management of the REMS
contract was Hopkins' principal responsibility at that time, and
Warder cited "serious deficiencies" on the project when he
opposed plaintiff's re-proposal in July 1983. At the beginning
of trial, however, counsel for defendant stated that Hopkins'
competence was not at issue. In addition, at the close of the
direct examination of Sandra Kinsey, one of Hopkins' two deputies
on the REMS project, counsel for plaintiff confirmed that
defendant was not seeking to argue that there were any problems
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with plaintiff's  erformance, specifically on REMS: _4/
Defendant has unmistakably conceded that there is no basis
for any legitimate criticism of plaintiff's technical competence
on the REMS project (or any other). Hence Mr. Warder's expressed
concern about "serious deficiencies" on REMS is revealed for the
pretext that it was. Given the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine para- * I
4/ Mr. Huron: Your Honor, if I may address a question?
That would conclude my direct examination
except for one possible line of questioning.
There was some testi ony in the defense case
concerning a second partner review conducted by
Mr.  arder and a quality control review, both
on the REMS project. It's our understanding,
the plaintiff's understanding that the issue of
Miss Hop ins' technical competence and so forth
is not in the case at this  oint and I
therefore  oul  not propose to go into those
atters with the witness. However, if there's
any   if the defense disputes that at this






Well, I thought we had the issues pretty
clearly lined out. While there may have been
one or two c mments by short form people mostly
that had questions about technical competence,
I understood from Mr. Connor's testimony and
other testimony that that was not an issue of
the partnership decision and I understood it
was not raised by Price Waterhouse  hen I tried
to find out what the issue was at the o ening
of the case. Is that still the situation?
hat's not changed, your honor.
Very well. So I don't see any  oint in
going into that.




digm, as well as Warder's own sex-based remarks, the most
plausible inference is that he discriminated on the basis of sex
in opposing plaintiff's re-proposal.  /
CONCLUSION
There is no question that discrimination based on sex was
present both in Price Waterhouse's decision to place Ann Hop ins
on hold in March 1983 and in the firm's subsequent refusal to
accord her the same degree of full reconsideration given to men
put on hold. The proof of discrimination is both direct and
indirect, ranging from the explicit advice that plaintiff needed
to walk, talk and dress "more femininely" to the failure to
/ E.g., saying that plaintiff talked like a "truck driver," although men
at the firm used worse language, or q estioning whether  omen with  ore than
one child should be  orking. Focusing on a single comment by plaintiff
concerning her behavior toward Warder   en he was on the State Depart ent1 s
EMS project in 1980, defen ant glosses over the fact that his own performance
was so deficient that State officials insisted that he be re oved. There is
nothing here that justifies Warder's expressed prejudice against plaintiff and
other women in the workplace.
/ It is unnecessary for plaintiff to show that both Warder and Donald
Epelbaum based their opposition to plaintiff's re-prc osal on her sex; one
(Warder) is sufficient. Rogers v. Equal Enployment Op ortunity Co missian,
supra. Nevertheless, it is significant both that Epelbaum's credibility is
open to serious challenge   he told his partners at the fateful July 1983
meeting that he ha  supported plaintiff the previous year, but he testified
that he had actually switched from yes to hold by November 1982   and that he
took no action at all wi h respect to a man  hom he did not believe was an
"appro riate" candidate for ad ission. Epelbaum was contradicted not only b 
plaintiff but also by his partner Roger Marcellin. They disagreed in major
respects about the accuracy of Marcellin's notes of his December 1982 "office
visit" interview of Epelbaum. Conpare PI. Ex. 17 and Tr. 331 with Tr. 395-
400. The most plausible reading of the evidence is that Epelbaum also engaged
in sex discrimination.
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balance plaintiff's attributes as men's were weighed. 2J
When it became clear to plaintiff that she would not be
admitted to partnership, and when Donald Epelbaum advised her to
resign, she did so. She wanted to be a partner then, howe er,
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Attorneys for Plaintiff II
II Plaintiff also presented statistical evidence, but this does not stan 
alone. Rather, the trends revealed    hich defendant has criticized but not
undermined   are consistent with the other proof of discriminati n. In this
respect, it is significant that Price Waterhouse has not challenged Dr. Mann's
conclusion that a result of 7  omen of 662 partners  ould not have occurred by
chance even if the percentage of w men available for hire and eventual
consideration for partnership was as low as two percent. It is also
significant that defendant concedes that, even under its own analysis of
pro osal rates, there was still "a 'shortfall' of about 3 females in 1983 and
about 2 females in 1984" (Defendant's Brief at 26).
8/ In footnote 1, page 1, of its brief, defendant invites this Court to
prejudge and wr ngly limit the relief to be given plaintiff and in doing so to
negate the basic premise of Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra, that a
partnership may not discriminate in access to partner status if it  akes  hat
a term or privilege of e ployment. Defendant's contention  hat even if it
does violate Title VII and breach its enplo ment contract with plaintiff, she
ust continue to work for Price Waterhouse or else forfeit her remedies is
inexplicable and is certainly not su ported by the cases cited. Since there
is no limitation on. the nu ber of Price Waterhouse partners and  herefore no
question of displacing innocent third parties, the contention amounts to an
insistence that a victim of discrimination remain indentured to the
discriminator until she can secure a fin l favorable court judg ent, even
though she has been advised to resign.
CERTI ICATE OF SERVICE
On May 24, 1985, copies of Plaintiff's Reply Brief and
Plaintiff's Response to Order of May 15, 1985 were delivered by
hand to;
Kathy D. Ireland
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Douglas'S. Huron
